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Brexit will be negative – but how 
negative is the question 
The fourth book in our Bite-Size book series ‘Brexit and Northern 
Ireland: Bordering on Confusion?’ has now been published and is 
available for you to enjoy! We’re celebrating the book’s release by 
giving you a sneak peek at Centre for Brexit Studies Researcher 
David Hearne’s chapter. 
Solving the issue of the border between Northern Ireland and the 
Republic of Ireland has proved intractable in the Brexit process. The 
issue of the Irish border and backstop could potentially derail an 
agreed Brexit creating significant economic damage to both parts of 
the island as well as undermining the peace achieved by the 1998 
Good Friday Agreement. 
Edited by ex-BBC journalist John Mair and Dr Steven McCabe from 
the Centre for Brexit Studies at Birmingham City University, as well as 
Leslie Budd from the Open University and Neil Fowler, the book 
includes a foreword from long-standing Northern Ireland commentator 
Malachi O’Doherty and an afterword by Daily Mail journalist Peter 
Oborne. 
The book examines the range of questions about Brexit and Northern 
Ireland from a wide variety of perspectives and is a major contribution 
to the debate about the issues. 
Enjoy your sneak peek below… 
 
By David Hearne 
There has been a plethora of academic work investigating the impact 
of Brexit on the UK, particularly from the perspective of its economic 
impact. 
Much of this work investigates the impact of Brexit at a national level, 
where a variety of estimates have been produced. In terms of the 
subnational impact (both on Northern Ireland and more generally on 
the regions and nations of the UK), the ultimate result will in part 
depend on the overall economic impact. Government can take steps 
to cushion particular areas or groups from any blow, but the cost of 
doing so will then fall on others. 
At this point it is worth addressing the elephant in the room: the 
prognostications of economists do not have a fantastic reputation, 
particularly since the financial crisis of 2008. 
Some of this opprobrium is deserved, but much is not. Forecasting 
has a well-justified reputation for inaccuracy, and most academic 
economists eschew it for this reason. However, where forecasts are 
typically unconditional – ‘the economy will grow 3 per cent this year’ – 
academic estimates are usually conditional on other things remaining 
the same (i.e. they are presented ceteris paribus) and these have a 
much better reputation for accuracy. 
Nationally we can be confident that the economic impact of Brexit on 
the UK will be negative, although there is considerably uncertainty as 
to its magnitude. 
This uncertainty is substantial – one paper suggested that plausible 
estimates of the cost of Brexit lie in the range of a 1 per cent to a 10 
per cent of per capita income (Sampson, 2017). In my judgement, this 
is a reasonable assessment. Academic articles that predict anything 
other than a negative economic impact from Brexit are extremely rare. 
Those that do so (Minford, 2016, 2017), typically involve assumptions 
that many would find implausible (Sampson, Dhingra, Ottaviano, & 
Reenen, 2017). 
On a subnational level, most work suggests that Northern Ireland 
would face a similar hit to the UK, although again there is 
considerable uncertainty over the specifics. One important work found 
that 11.7 per cent of the Northern Irish economy was exposed to EU 
demand (Chen et al., 2018). This does not mean that leaving the EU 
will imply that the Northern Irish economy will shrink by 12 per cent 
but rather gives the extent of its potential exposure. 
To put this into some kind of context, it is rather lower than some parts 
of Great Britain (e.g. Cumbria or Lancashire at over 15 per cent of 
GDP), but is similar to levels of exposure to Brexit in the Republic of 
Ireland (estimated by the same authors at just over 10 per cent of 
GDP). 
Different methodologies 
It is worth pointing out that different methodologies give quite a wide 
range of estimates. The related findings of Los, McCann, Springford, 
and Thissen (2017) contrast considerably with those of Dhingra, 
Machin, and Overman (2017) in terms of the relative spread of ‘Brexit 
pain’1. Again, it is worth noting that in spite of these differences, the 
net economic effect of Brexit is estimated to be negative in all 
scenarios and across all regions. 
Unsurprisingly, Northern Ireland trades particularly intensively with the 
Republic of Ireland. The overwhelming majority of this trade is 
represented by trade in goods (Northern Ireland Statistics and 
Research Agency, 2019a), which is likely to be particularly affected by 
any cross-border frictions. 
Frustratingly, there are two different sources of data on Northern Irish 
trade, each with its own set of strengths and weaknesses. 
Nevertheless, the broad picture is clear. According to HMRC, 
Northern Ireland exported some £3.2bn of goods to the Republic of 
Ireland and imported approximately £2.2bn of goods in 2018 (HMRC, 
2019). 
This figure has grown substantially since 2015 (ibid.) Indeed, bilateral 
trade in goods with the Republic of Ireland constitutes nearly one third 
of Northern Ireland’s total international trade in goods, although its 
trade with Great Britain is much greater yet (Northern Ireland Statistics 
and Research Agency, 2019a), unsurprisingly given economic 
evidence on intra-country versus inter-country trade (Comerford & 
Rodríguez Mora, 2019). 
Of particular concern must be the fact that such a large proportion of 
total Northern Irish trade with the Republic is in agricultural products 
and food. 
Of the £5.4bn total trade, over £1.9bn is in food and live animals 
(HMRC, 2019). Since sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) checks are by 
far the most onerous of all checks imposed on imports to the EU, this 
is likely to prove a major issue. 
Moreover, since the EU imposes high tariffs on agricultural imports 
the costs for those engaged in this trade could be insurmountable. 
Insofar as economic integration is a force promoting peace – since all 
sides have a pecuniary interest in avoiding conflict – the loss of this 
trade is a political as well as an economic concern. 
Vehicle crossings and their impact 
There were some 46m vehicle crossings at the border between the 
Republic of Ireland in and Northern Ireland in 2018 (Northern Ireland 
Statistics and Research Agency, 2019b). Of these, some 3.84m 
involved HGVs and a further 4.98m involved LGVs. 
As such, it is clear that any impediment to traffic flows at the main 
borders would have serious repercussions. These cannot be avoided 
in the event of a hard border even with the most streamlined of 
operations, particularly if the UK diverges from EU regulations in 
agriculture etc. An international border would impede the free flow of 
goods traffic. 
Lawless and Morgenroth (2019) suggest that total Irish trade with the 
UK could fall by more than 30 per cent (representing a total fall of over 
4 per cent of all Irish trade) as a result of tariffs. 
Given that they too find that agriculture will be one of the sectors 
hardest hit (particularly meat and dairy), there is clear scope for 
economic damage across the island of Ireland and of significant new 
impediments to North-South trade. 
More broadly, even in the absence of a hard border, there is evidence 
that the economy of the Republic will be smaller than it would have 
been in the absence of Brexit (Bergin, Garcia-Rodriguez, Morgenroth, 
& Smith, 2017). 
The heightened inflation that followed as a result of Sterling’s 
depreciation after the 2016 referendum has already hit incomes in 
Northern Ireland and some evidence suggests that this impact has 
been more severe in than in other parts of the UK (Breinlich, 
Leromain, Novy, & Sampson, 2017). 
Meanwhile, evidence from a ‘synthetic counterfactual’ economy 
generated by a matching algorithm already suggests that the UK 
economy is non-trivially smaller than it would be had it voted to 
Remain in the EU in 2016 (Born, Müller, Schularick, & Sedláček, 
2017). 
To conclude, there is substantial uncertainty regarding the magnitude 
– but not the direction – of the impact of Brexit on the UK economy in 
general. Such uncertainty naturally extends to Northern Ireland, 
although there is some tentative evidence that the impact will be more 
negative than for the UK as a whole. Most analysis suggests that a 
hard Brexit would lead to significantly more economic pain than a soft 
Brexit, although in both cases the total impact is negative vis-à-vis the 
status quo ante. 
Of particular concern in the Northern Irish context is the impact on 
agriculture, which represents a large proportion of total cross-border 
trade. 
In addition to the economic impact of trade frictions, there are likely to 
be clear symbolic and highly visible effects. These will take the form of 
SPS inspection posts, the need to ensure proper customs clearance 
for any goods moving south of the border (representing a very 
obvious change to those involved) and the potential for culls, wasted 
product and other visible agricultural disruptions. 
Brexit and Northern Ireland: Bordering on Confusion? Is available 
NOW in paperback and in Kindle. Find out more here. 
Join us at one of the launches we are hosting to celebrate the release 
of this book! 
Brexit and Northern Ireland: London Book Launch 
Hosted by Dr Steve McCabe, with Vernon Bogdanor CBE, Paul 
Glennon & Dr Graham Gudgin 
5pm-7pm 
Thursday 17 October 2019 
University Women’s Club 2 Audley Square London W1K 1DB 
Free tickets via Eventbrite here. 
Brexit and Northern Ireland: Belfast Book Launch 
Hosted by Róisín McAuley, alongside Katy Hayward, Dr Leslie Budd, 
Irwin Armstrong, Aodhan Connolly and Brian Feeney 
5pm-7pm 
Thursday 24 October 2019 
The Open University 110 Victoria Street Belfast BT1 3GN 
Free booking via Eventbrite here. 
 
